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Studies of the differences in
operating performance of mi-
nority- and nonminority-
owned commercial banks date
back to the 1970s and early
1980s.1  The focal point of much of this research
was to investigate the long-term viability of
minority-owned institutions.  Some studies
investigated declining lending trends among
minority institutions (Boorman and Kwast 1974
and Meinster and Elyasiani 1988), while others
concerned the possible adverse consequences of
these trends on the economic development of
the inner cities (for example, Kwast and Black
1983).  As more attention is devoted to econom-
ic development prospects in our nation’s core
urban centers, the question of what role minori-
ty-owned banks (and other specially designated
banks, including those owned by women) might
play in the economic development of these
communities naturally arises.2
Studies comparing the economic perfor-
mance of minority- and nonminority-owned
banks, for the most part, have revealed that
the minority-owned banks have tended to be
smaller, somewhat less profitable, and more
expenditure prone than comparable groups of
nonminority banks (Colby 1993).  In addition,
earlier studies reported that minority-owned
banks tended to operate with lower ratios of
equity capital to assets, to employ more con-
servative asset portfolio management policies,
and to post higher loan losses than their non-
minority peers (Brimmer 1971, Boorman and
Kwast 1974, Bates and Bradford 1980, and
Kwast 1981).
In contrast to these negative findings, a
more recent study by Meinster and Elyasiani
(1988) found that minority-owned banks had
significantly improved their capital ratios and
decreased their holdings of liquid assets, while
expanding their use of purchased funds.  The
authors also reported that there were no signifi-
cant differences in the pricing and asset-liability
management decisions in the overall financial
performance of minority-owned banks com-
pared with a sample of nonminority-owned
banks.  However, Meinster and Elyasiani ob-
served that banks owned by African Americans
continued to reflect the financial performance
characteristics associated with minority-owned
bank performance in the 1960s and 1970s.
Caution must be exercised when compar-
ing minority-owned with nonminority-owned
banks on the basis of broadly defined markets
or locational attributes.  Studies by Clair
(1988), Hunter (1978), and Mehdian and Elya-
siani (1992) suggest that only when the two
sets of banks are operating in identical or very
similar market areas (in terms of economic and
demographic characteristics) with similar cus-
tomer bases is it safe to attribute differences in
operating performance to differences in owner-
ship and/or customer ethnicity.
Given the inherent difficulty in construct-
ing samples of minority- and nonminority-
owned banks which serve identical market
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areas, it is not surprising to find mixed conclu-
sions in the literature assessing the long-term
viability of minority-owned banks as engines
of community economic development.3
In this article, we follow an approach
similar in spirit to that used by Mehdian and
Elyasiani (1992) in conducting an analysis of
the operating performance of minority- and
women-owned banks and comparable nonmi-
nority-owned banks from the perspective of
production efficiency.4  Instead of simply com-
paring the operating performance of a distinct
sample of minority- and women-owned banks
with a distinct sample of nonminority-owned
banks, we compare the operating performance
of our minority and nonminority sample banks
relative to a set of so-called best-practice
banks.  This set of best-practice banks, which
can include all types of banks regardless of
ownership, represents those institutions which
produce their financial products and services at
the lowest cost using the most efficient mix of
productive inputs or factors of production.
Thus, unlike the older literature which infers
managerial inefficiencies for minority-owned
banks from simple comparisons of financial
ratios, this article measures such managerial
inefficiencies directly from the banks’ cost
(production) functions.  We are thus able to
determine which banks—various categories of
minority- or women-owned and nonminority-
owned—are more efficiently managed.5
Much of the literature examining the per-
formance of minority banks is descriptive or
based on regression analyses which lack well-
developed theoretical underpinnings.  In this
article, we use production theory and modern
econometric procedures to extract information
on managerial efficiency in the production of
financial services.  Essentially, we estimate a
firm-specific management efficiency measure
for each bank in our sample using a standard
bank cost function.  As suggested by the earlier
literature comparing the operating performance
of minority- and nonminority-owned banks,
differences in management efficiency among
our sample banks could be due to a host of fac-
tors.  Differences in managerial efficiency could
result from differences in operating strategies,
organizational structures, primary market areas,
or customer bases.  Below, we attempt to identi-
fy some of the determinants of observed mana-
gerial inefficiencies in our sample banks.
The empirical approach
In carrying out our empirical analysis, we
use the methodology developed by Aigner et
al. (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977)—
the stochastic cost frontier approach (described
briefly below)—to calculate a measure of pro-
duction efficiency (an inefficiency score) for
each bank in our sample.  These scores are
used to gain further insight into the determi-
nants of inefficiency.
Following Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeus-
en and Broeck (1977), a firm’s cost function,
that is, the relationship among the firm’s total
cost of producing various products or services,
the products or services themselves, and the
prices of the inputs used to produce these prod-
ucts or services may be written as
1) TCf = f (Yi, Pk) + ef   f = 1, ..., n,
where TCf  represents the firm’s total costs, Yi
represents the various products or services
produced by the firm, Pk represents the prices
of the inputs used by the firm in the production
of the products or services, and e represents a
random disturbance term which allows the cost
function to vary stochastically, that is, it cap-
tures the fact that there is uncertainty regarding
the level of total costs that will be incurred for
given levels of production.  The uncertainty in
the cost function can be further decomposed in
the following manner:
2) ef  = Vf  + Uf .
In equation 2, V represents random un-
controllable factors that affect total costs
(such as weather, luck, labor strikes, or ma-
chine performance).  These factors (and their
impact on costs) are assumed to be indepen-
dent of each another.  They are identically
distributed as normal variates and the value of
the error term in the cost relationship is, on
average, equal to zero.
The U term in equation 2 represents firm-
specific cost deviations or errors which are due
to factors that are under the control of the man-
agement of the firm.  Such factors include the
quantity of labor, capital, or other inputs hired
or employed in the production of the firm’s
products and services and the amount chosen
to be produced.6ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 22
The stochastic frontier cost function ap-
proach maintains that managerial or controlla-
ble inefficiencies only increase costs above
frontier or best-practice levels, and that the
random fluctuations or uncontrollable factors
can either increase or decrease costs.  Since
uncontrollable factors are assumed to be sym-
metrically distributed, the frontier of the cost
function, f(Yi, Pk) + e, is clearly stochastic.  In
practical terms, the U component of the error
term in the cost function given by equation 2,
representing managerial inefficiency, causes
the cost of production to be above the frontier
or best-practice levels.  Jondrow et al. (1982)
estimated a firm’s relative inefficiency using
the ratio of the variability of the U and V
terms in equation 2, which is measured by the
ratio of the standard deviation Q = su / sv ,
where su  and sv are the standard deviations of
U and V. Small values of Q imply that the
uncontrollable factors dominate the controlla-
ble inefficiencies.
In summary, the stochastic frontier ap-
proach incorporates a two-component error
structure—one being a controllable factor and
the other a random uncontrollable component.
The controllable component consists of fac-
tors controllable by management.7
The cost function
To estimate the error term in the cost func-
tion given by equation 2 and to calculate each
bank’s efficiency index, we statistically fitted an
empirical cost function of the following form:
3) lnTCf = a0 + Sai lnYi + ½ SSaij lnYi lnYj
+ S bk lnPk+ ½ SS bkh lnPk lnPh
+ SS gik  lnYi lnPk + ef,
where TCf  represents total costs, Yi represents
the ith output, Pk represents the price of the kth
input, ef  is the disturbance term, and ln repre-
sents the natural logarithm.  The cost function
in equation 3 is a standard translog cost func-
tion.  In fitting this cost function, standard
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions were
imposed.8
The sample data and variable definitions
The data for each sample bank examined
were obtained from commercial bank “Re-
ports of condition and income” filed with
bank regulators.  Average data for the four
TABLE 1
Frequency distribution of sample banks
A. Minority-owned commercial banks
African Hispanic Asian Native
American Women American American American Total
Total 35 5 21 29 5 95
National
charter 11 3 10 11 3 38
State
charter 24 2 11 18 2 57
Bank holding
company 17 5 8 10 1 41
De novo
banks 3 0 0 7 0 10
Federal Reserve
member 13 4 11 14 3 45
B. Nonminority-owned commercial banks
National State Bank holding Federal Reserve
Total charter charter company De novo member
127 66 61 59 6 82
Source:  Federal Reserve Board of Governors, “Report of condition and income 1992,” Washington, DC, magnetic
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quarters of 1992 was used.  The sample was
composed of all minority and women’s banks
and a comparable sample of nonminority-
owned banks operating in 1992.  The selec-
tion of comparable nonminority banks was
based on size, location, market served, and
start-up date.  Initially, a nonminority-owned
bank of similar size, established in the same
year, with its headquarters in the same city as
each sample minority or women’s bank was
identified.  In cases where comparable banks
could not be located, we expanded the search
to encompass the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) of the minority- or women-owned
sample bank.  If we were unable to find a
match in the same MSA, we selected an insti-
tution from a similar MSA market within the
same state.  This selection procedure resulted
in a total of 127 banks being classified as
comparable nonminority institutions.  Panels
A and B of table 1 provide data on the charac-
teristics of the groups of banks.
Variable definitions
In the empirical cost function in equation
3, total costs (TC) were defined to include all
labor and physical capital expenses, as well as
the interest expense incurred by the bank, that
is, the total costs of inputs used to produce the
bank’s various outputs.  Four outputs were
included in the cost function and were mea-
sured as the dollar value of (1) all money
market assets, Ym; (2) commercial and indus-
trial loans, Yc; (3) other loans, Yl; and (4)
other bank outputs, Yo, which were proxied by
annual noninterest income service charges,
excluding gains and losses on foreign ex-
change transactions.
Labor, physical capital, and funds (includ-
ing deposits) were treated as inputs used in the
production of bank assets.  With respect to
input prices, the price of labor, P1, was calcu-
lated by dividing total salaries and fringe bene-
fits by the number of full-time equivalent em-
ployees (including bank officers).  The price of
physical capital, P2, was defined to be equal to
the ratio of total expenses for premises and
fixed assets to total assets.  The price of funds,
P3, was computed by taking the ratio of total
interest expense (paid on deposits, federal
funds purchased, securities sold under agree-
ments to repurchase, demand notes issued to
the U.S. Treasury, mortgage indebtedness,
TABLE 2
Mean values of key ratios
Non- All African Hispanic Asian Native
minority minority American Women American American American
Commercial
loans 12.41 11.92 11.16** 17.00** 11.71 25.31*** 10.32
Residential
mortgage loans 18.17 13.57*** 13.89*** 7.88** 11.57*** 10.91** 12.30**
Liquid assets 33.17 36.07 35.78 41.19** 41.48** 23.59*** 45.68**
Delinquent assets 1.51 1.46 1.49 1.03* 1.05* 2.04** 1.15
Time deposits 40.19 43.48 42.75 33.52* 44.09 48.02** 48.49**
Retail deposits 13.12 14.49 13.93 7.12** 11.78 11.91 9.48
Interest expenses 2.97 3.08* 2.98 3.04 3.09* 3.10* 2.87
Noninterest
operating
expenses 4.01 4.33*** 4.92*** 4.17** 4.72** 4.97*** 4.57**
Return on assets .554 .485 .681**  .948** .821** –.309*** .568
Return on equity 5.91 5.78 7.41*** 9.39** 9.61*** –.023*** 5.53
Equity 9.03 8.86 7.83 7.87 7.48 11.15* 8.62
***, **, and * are significantly different from nonminority banks at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent levels, respectively.
Note:  All ratios except return on assets and return on equity are relative to total assets.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1994).ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 24
subordinated debts and debentures, and other
borrowed money) to the sum of total funds.
Empirical results
Table 2 provides some key balance-sheet
and income expenditure ratios for the sample
banks in our study.  When minority- and
women-owned banks were grouped in one
category, called all minority, their asset portfo-
lios and financing strategies were similar to
those of nonminority banks, for the most part,
except for a lower ratio of residential mortgage
loans to total assets.  In addition, the two
groups’ mean return on assets (ROA) and mean
return on equity (ROE) were not significantly
different.  However, while African-American-
owned banks had almost identical asset and
financial statistics to those of nonminority
banks, other minority- and women-owned
banks were quite different from nonminority
banks.  Women-owned banks, for example, had
higher ratios of commercial loans and liquid
assets to total assets than nonminority-owned
banks, but lower ratios of residential mort-
gage loans to total assets.  They also posted
lower ratios of time deposits and retail depos-
its to total assets than nonminority banks.  On
the other hand, Asian-American-owned banks
had higher ratios of commercial loans and
delinquent assets to total assets than nonminor-
ity-owned banks, as well as higher ratios of
time deposits to total deposits.  These banks
also posted lower ratios of residential mort-
gage loans and liquid assets to total assets
than nonminority-owned banks.  In terms of
profitability, the Asian-American-owned
banks experienced negative returns over the
sample period, while the other minority- and
women-owned banks showed positive returns.
The descriptive statistics also show a sig-
nificant difference in both the interest and
noninterest operating expense categories be-
tween the groups of banks.  The minority- and
women-owned banks posted significantly high-
er ratios of noninterest operating expenses to
total assets than did the nonminority banks.
With respect to the ratio of interest expenses
 to total assets, all minority-owned banks again
posted significantly higher ratios.  However,
among the minority- and women-owned banks,
only the Hispanic-American and Asian-Ameri-
can banks had higher ratios of interest expens-
es to total assets.
Table 3 presents statistics for the variables
used to estimate the cost function in equation 3.
The input prices of minority- and women-
owned banks exhibited a mixed pattern com-
pared with those of the nonminority banks.
TABLE 3
Means for variables used in translog cost function
As a percent As a percent
Nonminority of assets Minority of assets
Cost function inputs
Price of labor 35.79 (16.83) — 31.99* (7.12) —
Price of capital 2.54 (1.88) — 3.17** (3.21) —
Price of funds .036 (.017) — .032 (.007) —
Cost function outputs (mil.)
All money market assets 29.15 (48.95) 26.11 (16.10) 33.81 (70.05) 28.36 (15.70)
Commercial/industrial loans 12.93 (49.21) 12.41 (9.91) 14.45 (37.38) 11.97 (7.89)
Other loans 18.11 (79.37) 17.97 (30.04) 16.52 (65.43) 11.06** (28.12)
Other bank products
   and services 1.85 (7.61) 1.75 (7.50) 1.66 (4.10) 1.45* (1.01)
Total assets (mil.) 102.3 (192.7) — 120.8* (23.3) —
Total costs (mil.) 7.54 (12.99) 7.87 (6.57) 8.43* (14.68) 7.80* (1.80)
**, * Difference in means significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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While the price of funds at all of the sample
banks was similar, the prices paid for capital
inputs by minority- and women-owned banks
were significantly higher, on average, than
those paid by the nonminority banks.  On the
other hand, the prices paid for labor inputs
were significantly lower at the minority- and
women-owned banks.  Despite this difference,
total measured costs were significantly higher
at the minority- and women-owned banks.  In
terms of asset allocation, the nonminority
banks had a higher percentage of assets in
commercial and industrial loans, other loans,
and other bank products and services, but
operated with a lower percentage of assets
in the money market category than did the
minority- and women-owned banks.
Management inefficiency
Higher capital input prices at minority-
and women-owned institutions relative to the
control group suggest inefficiency, particularly
in light of the more liquid asset portfolios held
by the minority- and women-owned banks.
Using the parameter values and standard
errors of the residuals obtained from estimating
a normalized version of the translog cost func-
tion in equation 3, inefficiency scores for the
sample banks were calculated.  The descriptive
statistics displayed in table 4 suggest that both
groups of banks produced products and servic-
es at a higher cost than necessary, that is, a
perfectly efficient bank would have an ineffi-
ciency index of zero.  The average inefficiency
score of the minority- and women-owned
banks was higher (31.4 percent) than the aver-
age inefficiency score of the nonminority-
owned banks (24.8 percent) and the difference
was statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.  Thus, on average, it appears that the
minority- and women-owned banks were rela-
tively inefficient institutions.
 Asian-American-owned banks experi-
enced the highest level of inefficiency (36.2
percent), followed by African-American
(34.8 percent), Hispanic-American (33.1 per-
cent), and Native-American banks (32.0 per-
cent).  Banks owned by women were more
efficient than any of the other minority-owned
banks but less efficient than the average non-
minority bank.  The results also indicated that
the holding company structure was the most
efficient structure for the minority- and wom-
en-owned banks.  This could be the result of
difficulties encountered by minority- and wom-
en-owned banks that are not affiliated with
holding companies in adapting customer and
TABLE 4
Inefficiency score for sample banks
Inefficiency score
Standard
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Nonminority banks .248 .192 .056 .914
Minority banks .314* .105 .068 .966
African-American banks .348* .093 .032 .902
Women’s banks .267* .168 .041 .925
Hispanic-American banks .331* .126 .035 .936
Asian-American banks .362** .110 .069 .955
Native-American banks .320* .098 .046 .928
National chartered banks .318* .108 .037 .944
State chartered banks .320* .112 .050 .958
Bank holding companies .302** .083 .074 .903
De novo banks .347* .148 .062 .941
Federal Reserve institutions .332* .130 .048 .921
Combined sample 2.710 .182 .035 .966
**, * Significantly different from nonminority sample banks at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1994).ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 26
service delivery systems in unique markets.  It
could also be due simply to a lack of manageri-
al experience at these banks.
The relationship between firm inefficiency
and bank characteristics was estimated using
the following Tobit regression model:9
Ui = ao + b1MINORITY + b2LIQUID
ASSET + b3COMMERCIAL LOAN +
b4RETAIL DEPOSIT +b5ASSET +
b6BHC + b7DE NOVO + b8NATIONAL
+ b9 3-FIRM + b10FEDMEMB + ei,
        where Ui = individual bank’s inefficiency score,
MINORITY = minority- or women-owned indicator
variable (1 for minority- and wom-
en-owned banks and 0 otherwise),
LIQUID
ASSET = ratio of liquid assets to total assets,
COMMER-
CIAL LOAN = ratio of commercial loans to total
assets,
RETAIL
DEPOSIT = ratio of retail deposits to total
deposits,
ASSET = total assets,
BHC = bank holding company dummy
(1 if the financial institution is some
form of bank holding company
and 0 otherwise),
DE NOVO = de novo banks (1 for banks estab-
lished within the last three years
and 0 otherwise),
NATIONAL = national or state charter (1 for
national chartered and 0 for state
chartered banks),
3-FIRM = three firm deposit concentration
ratio of respective metropolitan
statistical market, and
FEDMEMB =  Federal Reserve membership
(1 for members and 0 otherwise).
In examining the determinants of ineffi-
ciency among the sample banks, we included
variables related to portfolio composition
(COMMERCIAL LOAN) and liquidity
(LIQUID ASSET), financing or funding sourc-
es (RETAIL DEPOSIT), organizational char-
acteristics [for example, whether the bank was
a member of the Federal Reserve System
(FEDMEMB) or organized as a holding com-
pany (BHC)], charter type (NATIONAL), mar-
ket concentration (3-FIRM), and whether the
sample bank was a de novo bank (DE NOVO).
While it is difficult to state a priori how
each of these factors will influence bank ineffi-
ciency, it seems reasonable to expect de novo
banks to be less efficient than other banks, and
banks operating in concentrated markets to be
less efficient than those operating in very com-
petitive markets.
The regression results presented in table 5
show that the coefficient on the minority/wom-
en ownership dummy variable was positive and
statistically significant.  This implies that these
banks were less efficient than their nonminori-
ty counterparts.  Lending in the commercial
and industrial loan category was also found to
be associated with higher levels of inefficien-
cy, while the bank holding company organiza-
tional structure was found to be associated with
lower levels of inefficiency.  As was expected,
newly established banks tended to be less effi-
cient than other banks and banks operating in
less competitive markets tended to be less
efficient than banks operating in more compet-
itive, less concentrated markets.
Conclusion
Management efficiency has always been
an important topic in banking research.  Previ-
ous studies comparing the operating perfor-
mance of minority- and women-owned banks
with that of nonminority banks often reached
mixed conclusions.  This may have been due to
the difficulty of identifying groups of minority
and nonminority banks that are comparable
along such dimensions as size and customer
base.  This article reported on the results of
research which examined differences in the
operating performance of minority- and wom-
en-owned banks from the viewpoint of produc-
tion efficiency.  Instead of simply comparing
the operating performance of a distinct sample
of minority- and women-owned banks with a
distinct sample of nonminority-owned banks,
we compared the operating performance of all
of our sample banks relative to a set of best-
practice banks.  This set of best-practice banks,
including all types of sampled banks regardless
of ownership ethnicity or gender, represents
those institutions that produced their financial
products and services at the lowest cost using
the most efficient mix of productive inputs or
factors of production.  Thus, unlike the older
literature which suggests managerial ineffi-
ciencies for minority-owned banks from simpleFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 27
Regression analysis
Dependent variable: inefficiency score
TABLE 5
Independent
variables Coefficient Standard error
Intercept .149 .024**
Minority .058 .032*
Liquid asset –.188 .112
Commercial loan .060 .036*
Retail deposit .132 .097
Asset –4.7E-6 6.7E-6
BHC –.073 .038**




Equation                              Chi-Square  = 142.06 * d.f. = 211
***, **, and * are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1994).
Tobit
The results of our analysis indi-
cated that, on average, while
banks from both the minority-
and women-owned and the non-
minority categories were ineffi-
cient, the average minority- or
women-owned bank was signifi-
cantly more inefficient than the
average nonminority bank.
Among the sampled minority-
and women-owned banks, the
women-owned banks were the
most efficient.  Banks owned by
Asian Americans were the least
efficient among the minority-
owned banks, followed by banks
owned by African Americans
and Hispanic Americans, respec-
tively.  De novo status was found
to be a key factor accounting for
higher levels of inefficiency.
One explanation for this finding
could be the lack of experience at
de novo banks in serving new
markets and customer bases.
Another factor found to be important in deter-
mining the level of inefficiency among the
sampled banks was the level of market concen-
tration.  The less competitive and more concen-
trated the bank’s local market, the higher its
level of inefficiency.
comparisons of financial ratios, we measured
such managerial inefficiencies directly from
the banks’ cost (production) functions.
We examined the performance of a sample
of minority- and women-owned and nonminor-
ity-owned banks operating during 1992.
NOTES
1In this article, minority-owned banks include those
owned by African Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Native Americans, and Asian Americans.  For a summary
of history and trends in minority ownership of commer-
cial banks see Price (1990).
2The recent controversy surrounding the acquisition of
Indecorp, a leading Chicago minority-owned bank by
ShoreBank Corporation, a nonminority-owned bank
known internationally for its development efforts, is a
case in point.  See Wilke (1995).
3In this regard, Dahl (1995) offers a methodology which
can potentially resolve this sample matching problem and,
thus, contribute to our understanding of the observed
differences in the operating performance of minority- and
nonminority-owned commercial banks.
4Meinster and Elyasiani (1988) analyzed the 1984 year-
end performance of a sample of 80 minority and 80
nonminority banks using a nonparametric efficiency
technique—data envelopment analysis—based on linear
programming principles.  This technique assumes that all
deviations from the best-practice cost frontier—including
those due to random uncontrollable factors—are due to
inefficient management.  The stochastic frontier cost
function approach used in this article does not assign
deviations from the frontier caused by random uncontrol-
lable factors to inefficient management.
5Research to date suggests that differences in managerial
ability to control costs or maximize revenues account for
as much as 20 percent of banking costs, while scale and
scope inefficiencies account for only about 5 percent of
costs.  Thus, it is important to determine if there are
significant managerial efficiency differences among banks
owned by different ethnic and gender groups to draw
more useful conclusions on long-term viability issues.
See Berger et al. (1993).
6This inefficiency term is derived from a zero-mean
normal, N(0,su
2), distribution truncated below zero.  See
Aigner et al. (1977) for a discussion and derivation of the
cost function and error term structure given in equation 2.
7See Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1993) for a
related estimation technique applied to thrift institutions.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 28
8Symmetry requires that aij = bji and ahk =  bkh.  The
duality of the firm’s cost and production function was
preserved by imposing the following conditions:
Sbk = 1, Sbhk = 0, and Sgik = 0.
9The Tobit regression model was used to eliminate the
possibility of biased ordinary least square estimates where
the dependent variable and error terms in the regression
format are truncated normal variables (Amemiya 1973).
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